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Introduction
Corporate governance occupies a central role in 
many academic disciplines. Management, account-
ing, economics, finance, and legal scholars, among 
others, examine the relationships between parties of 
interest to corporations, such as managers, owners, 
and creditors. To date, these collective efforts have 
concentrated around agency theory (Dalton et al., 
2007), which emphasizes the potential costs arising 
from the separation of management and ownership 
in public corporations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). However, the empirical evidence 
related to agency theory and the efficacy of the spe-
cific alignment or policing mechanisms aimed at 
mitigating agency costs—the residual loss of firm 
value as a result of managerial opportunism—
is weak (see Dalton et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 2007). 
Thus the debate related to our understanding and 
conceptualization of the agency problem and related 
policy mechanisms grows. In fact, the debate among 
legal scholars, which pits two different conceptu-
alizations of corporate governance against one an-
other (Lan and Heracleous, 2010), has more recently 
grown heated (see Bebchuk, 2007; Stout, 2007, 2008; 
Strine, 2006).  
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Abstract
Corporate governance research indicates that corporate boards of directors may be overly beholden to 
management, which can be detrimental to firm value creation. Drawing upon agency theory and the gover-
nance law literature, we examine the effects of a new SEC rule designed to lessen managerial power by in-
creasing large, long-term shareholders’ influence in the director nomination process. We predict and find 
support for a positive overall market reaction to the rule’s announcement as well as a greater reaction for 
firms with characteristics that suggest compromised board independence or greater CEO control. More-
over, we examine the implications of greater shareholder voice for another key stakeholder group, firm 
bondholders, and find evidence that it is also value increasing. We conclude by discussing important impli-
cations for theory and practice. 
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The theoretical foundations of this debate relate to 
the primacy of the various stakeholders in the corpo-
ration and the resulting role of the board of directors. 
In accordance with the traditional governance model, 
the so-called shareholder primacy model reasserts 
that shareholders are the legal owners of the firm in 
that they hold the rights to any residual value, and 
thus hold primacy over any other stakeholder in the 
corporation (Bebchuk, 2005; 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In this view, the role of the board of directors is to 
represent the interests of the owners and steer man-
agement into making decisions in the best interests of 
the shareholders, to whom they have fiduciary duty 
(Hart, 1993). As such, Bebchuk (2006) argues that 
shareholders must wield strong influence over direc-
tors, including their nomination and appointment to 
the board. The alternative model, dubbed the stake-
holder or director primacy model (e.g., Bainbridge, 
2003; Blair and Stout, 2001; Strine, 2006), asserts that 
all stakeholders (i.e., management, shareholders, 
creditors, employees, customers, etc.) join in team 
production; thus, the objective of the corporation is 
to maximize the “risk-adjusted returns” to all partic-
ipants (Lan and Heracleous, 2010: 298). In this view, 
the board is viewed as a legally independent entity, 
which mediates the interests of all stakeholders (Blair 
and Stout, 2001). These two perspectives differ in 
several respects, yet they share a common interest: 
value creation. While the shareholder primacy view 
promotes value creation for the shareholder, the di-
rector primacy model argues for value creation for 
the corporation as a whole. However, we argue that 
neither approach will reach its goal if top manage-
ment, arguably the most powerful of all stakeholder 
groups, is not adequately controlled. Evidence sug-
gests that all other stakeholders are at a great disad-
vantage vis-à-vis management because of the board 
nomination process. Prior research suggests that the 
nomination (and thus election) of directors to the 
board is largely influenced by the firm’s executives 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1995), and existing board mem-
bers have limited influence on the selection of future 
nominees (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). While recent 
regulatory changes now require nomination commit-
tees to be composed entirely of independent direc-
tors, the nomination of new directors is still suscep-
tible to management’s influence (see Worthen, 2011, 
for a recent example). Shareholders merely vote be-
tween different nominees, while any more aggres-
sive action is quite difficult and costly (e.g., a proxy 
fight). Even further removed, other stakeholders 
simply have no voice in director nomination or elec-
tion. As a result, nominated directors “run unop-
posed and their election is thus guaranteed” (Beb-
chuk, 2003: 44). In fact, Westphal and Zajac (1995: 60) 
argue that “[w]hile a variety of factors may facilitate 
management control over the board, the chief execu-
tive officer’s (CEO’s) dominance over the director se-
lection process has often been considered a primary 
source of management control.” As such, we propose 
that nonmanagement stakeholders suffer when the 
board fails to control management and, conversely, 
can benefit when the board nomination process al-
lows more direct involvement of one key stakeholder 
group—the firm’s shareholders. 
As the debate among legal scholars has increased, 
more stringent regulatory policy has begun to take 
shape. On the heels of the recent near collapse of the 
financial sector, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) took several decisive steps to redress pub-
lic concerns over the vigilance and loyalties of direc-
tors. While the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX) increased the independence of directors, 
the primary means by which shareholders can coun-
ter the top managements’ influence over board com-
position, proxy access, was not addressed by SOX. 
To remedy this, on 25 August 2010 the SEC passed 
a new proxy access rule, aiming to allow large, long-
term shareholders—who own at least three percent of 
the firm’s stock continuously for three years—to di-
rectly nominate potential directors, thereby provid-
ing shareholders greater influence in the nomination 
process and over the composition of the board. 
Taking the rule’s passage as an exogenous shock 
and using this setting as a natural experiment 
(Meyer, 1995), we investigate the stock market’s re-
action to this increase in shareholder influence. Be-
yond documenting the market’s positive response to 
this event, we develop a theoretical model explain-
ing why the market’s reaction varies based on the 
firm’s governance traits. Specifically, we draw upon 
agency theory to predict that the market’s reaction 
will be contingent on the firm’s board characteristics 
and the degree of managerial control. We find strong 
empirical support for our framework. Moreover, we 
investigate whether greater shareholder power over 
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director nomination is viewed positively by another 
important group of firm stakeholders—its creditors. 
If providing influence to shareholders is part of a ze-
rosum game and other stakeholder groups are likely 
to be hurt by greater shareholder control over the 
board, bondholders would react negatively. Con-
trary to this position, though, we predict and show 
that bondholders react positively to this change; as 
such, it appears that decreasing the power of man-
agement to co-opt the board benefits both sharehold-
ers and creditors. 
In total, this research offers several contributions. 
First, we integrate the growing debate in legal stud-
ies with management’s treatment of corporate gov-
ernance. Beyond the approach of Lan and Heracle-
ous (2010), who pertinently describe the director 
primacy model, our approach offers a more bal-
anced treatment of this debate and provides data fo-
cused on proxy access as it pertains to board nomi-
nations. Second, this study contributes to the debate 
in law by showing that governance regulations that 
enhance shareholder voice are in fact value enhanc-
ing, as they help overcome managerial power. Spe-
cifically, we see that benefits to other stakehold-
ers (i.e., creditors) accrue when shareholders gain 
greater control of director nominations, suggest-
ing that this control increases “the size of the pie 
for all,” rather than benefiting one nonmanagement 
stakeholder group at the expense of another. Third, 
our study offers important implications for agency 
theory. While the theory’s empirical record has been 
questioned in recent years, we demonstrate that the 
theory continues to have predictive power. When 
shareholders gain greater influence in the nomina-
tion of directors, thereby limiting top management’s 
influence over the board, additional value is created, 
and shareholder influence in nomination is most 
valuable when effective governance is challenged. 
Thus our work adds support to agency theory. Next, 
this work contributes important insights to the long 
stream of agency theory work on the shareholder-
bondholder conflict (e.g., Black and Cox, 1976; Fama 
and Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Modi-
gliani and Miller, 1958; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Finally, our theory and results provide insights that 
may aid policy makers in helping to determine the 
appropriate approach to governance regulations, es-
pecially as they relate to proxy access. 
Theory and hypotheses 
The role of the board, governance oversight, and 
board accountability 
The agency problem arises when an organization’s 
ownership and management are separated. The goals 
and desires of owners and managers conflict, and 
shareholders cannot effectively monitor managerial 
work (Eisenhardt, 1989). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
provide a formal derivation of agency costs, which 
include the monitoring and alignment expenditures 
borne by the owner/principal, as well as the residual 
loss to firm value that results from the agency con-
flict. Corporate governance scholars have since fo-
cused on investigating a number of alignment and 
policing mechanisms aimed at reducing this resid-
ual loss to firm value. The three primary mechanisms 
are: 1) the external market for corporate control, 2) in-
centive alignment through executive compensation, 
and 3) monitoring by an independent board of direc-
tors (Dalton et al., 2007). Herein, we focus on the third 
mechanism— board monitoring. 
According to the shareholder primacy model of 
corporate governance, boards of directors have a fi-
duciary responsibility to the firm’s shareholders and 
are thus charged with protecting and promoting 
shareholder interests. In order to better support this 
mandate, SOX increased the independence of cor-
porate boards. As such, boards are now largely out-
sider-dominated, which—in theory—should make 
them independent of management and thus more 
vigilant monitors for shareholders. 
However, more recent research suggests that inde-
pendence alone does not dictate a board’s effective-
ness at monitoring (Tuggle et al., 2010a). And, as Beb-
chuk (2003: 44) argues, “(a)lthough shareholder power 
to replace directors is supposed to be an important ele-
ment of our corporate governance system, it is largely 
a myth.” Thus, some corporate law scholars argue that 
the next step in solving the problem of ineffective mon-
itoring is greater shareholder voice in firm governance. 
One side of the debate—aligned with the shareholder 
primacy view of governance—argues that increasing 
the power and voice of shareholders in the matters of 
governance, including shareholder access to the proxy 
ballot (e.g., Bebchuk, 2003; 2005; 2006), would lead to 
long-term value maximization. It therefore argues that 
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shareholder voice-enhancing regulation adds value 
to the firm. The opposite side of the debate—aligned 
with the director primacy view of governance—advo-
cates that shareholders in general lack both the infor-
mation and the proper incentives to make the most op-
timal decisions for the firm (Bainbridge, 2006; Strine, 
2006); as such, broad attempts at regulating gover-
nance via increased shareholder power are value de-
stroying. However, as Bhagat and Romano note, 
“the goal of corporate law is to increase shareholder 
wealth;” thus the disagreements among legal schol-
ars are not focused on the end but “over the means to 
achieve that end” (2002b: 380). In other words, what 
these two views share is the desire for value creation 
(Bratton and Wachter, 2008) supported by vigilant 
and effective boards. In reality, however, evidence of 
poor board monitoring abounds (Dalton et al., 2007). 
While extant research shows that directors are subject 
to various sociopolitical influences, such as social dis-
tancing (Westphal and Khanna, 2003), director ingra-
tiation (Westphal and Stern, 2007), and friendship ties 
between directors and the CEO (Westphal, 1999)—all 
of which can undermine the independent stance of 
the board—it is likely that the initial nomination pro-
cess compromises a director’s independence from the 
outset, as the nomination of a potential director to the 
board can be strongly influenced by top management, 
and especially by the CEO (Chidambaran, Liu, and 
Prabhala, 2010). 
Indeed, extant research suggests that the firm’s top 
management plays a major role in determining the 
composition of the board (e.g., Lorsch and Maclver, 
1989; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Wade, O’Reilly, 
and Chandratat, 1990; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). As 
such, the stance of the board as either a shareholder 
advocate or an arbiter of all stakeholder interests is 
compromised, as directors may be prone to pursuing 
their own best interests (Certo et al., 2008), which are 
often tied to those of the CEO and other top managers 
due to the nomination system (Kumar and Sivaramak-
rishnan, 2008). Although in the post-SOX era nomi-
nating committees must be composed of independent 
directors, if “a group of current independent direc-
tors who are excessively amenable to management’s 
wishes are on the nominating committee, and if they 
informally consult with and accede to the chief execu-
tive’s preference about possible candidates, they may 
continue to nominate like-minded directors” (Clark, 
2005: 268–269). In practice then, foregoing a costly 
proxy fight, shareholders have little choice but to vote 
for the proposed slate of directors.1 Placed in an even 
weaker position, the firm’s other stakeholders have no 
influence over the director nomination or voting pro-
cess. As such, despite the legislative efforts to increase 
director independence, the struggle of stakeholders to 
create greater separation between the board and the 
firm’s management is still limited by the nomination 
and renomination processes. 
We contribute to the conversation on the role of 
law in corporate governance and extend agency the-
ory by investigating the market’s reaction to a new 
rule designed to increase large, long-term sharehold-
ers’ influence in director selection. Specifically, we ex-
amine whether greater ability of some shareholders 
to nominate potential board members is important to 
firm value, explicate what firm characteristics suggest 
greater potential for additional value creation, and in-
vestigate whether granting such shareholders more 
influence over board nomination is value enhancing 
to another key group with a legal stake in the corpo-
ration— the firm’s bondholders. 
The empirical context 
Because our study utilizes a natural experiment, it 
helps to summarize the context and the events leading 
up to the rule’s passage. The SEC’s 25 August 2010 
adoption of a new proxy access rule is directly related 
to the recent U.S. financial crisis, which is commonly 
viewed as the result of a systemic failure of current 
governance systems. In 2006, a shareholder of the in-
surance giant American International Group (AIG) 
submitted a shareholder proposal to amend AIG’s 
corporate bylaws so that a three percent shareholder 
could place a nominee in AIG’s annual proxy materi-
als. AIG contested this proposal in federal court argu-
ing that corporations have traditionally been allowed 
to exclude proposals of this kind. The U.S. Federal 
Court of Appeals based in New York City, however, 
overruled AIG’s objections, and thus opened up the 
possibility that broader director election proxy access 
could proceed on a case-by-case or company-by-com-
pany basis (AFSCME v. AIG, 2006).2 Moreover, there 
also existed the possibility that individual states could 
1. Bebchuk (2007) discusses in detail the dismal statistics regarding challenging the proposed slate of directors, including the rel-
atively low number of challenges and the low chances of winning a proxy fight. One of the greatest impediments to proposing 
and electing an alternative slate of directors is very high costs to shareholders.     
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selectively alter proxy access rules for corporations 
subject to their state corporate codes.3   
Fearful that this important issue would be ad-
dressed on a piecemeal and/or regional basis, Con-
gress explicitly gave the SEC the power and author-
ity to promulgate national rules on this subject in the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act, which was first introduced in the House 
in December 2009 and enacted in July 2010 (Dodd-
Frank Act, section 971, 2010).4 According to the SEC, 
the agency took decisive action because of severe con-
cerns expressed by many shareholders about board ac-
countability and responsiveness to shareholder inter-
ests (SEC, 2010). The regulators were also concerned 
about the extent to which public trust was damaged 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis. More pointedly, 
the SEC questioned “whether boards were exercising 
appropriate oversight of management” (SEC, 2010: 
7); thus, it appears that the SEC acknowledged that if 
boards were to become true champions of shareholder 
and other stakeholder interests, the current corporate 
governance system needed further revision. 
The SEC also recognized that “[a] principal way 
that shareholders can hold boards accountable and 
influence matters of corporate policy is through the 
nomination and election of directors” (SEC, 2010: 8; 
emphasis added). Taking into account the author-
ity given to it by Congress, the SEC actively solic-
ited public comments on proposed amendments de-
signed to address this issue. Based on this feedback, 
the SEC ultimately voted to adopt proxy access rules 
that would allow three percent shareholders who 
have held their shares at least three years to nomi-
nate their own candidates for the board of directors 
(SEC, 2010). The passage of this rule represented an 
exogenous event, as the SEC did not approve nor 
announce the final rule until 25 August 2010. More-
over, the final vote in favor of the new rule was very 
close, 3–2, attesting to the lack of certainty surround-
ing this event before the announcement. 
Next, we discuss our theoretical predictions re-
garding the impact of this ruling on shareholder 
value. In general, we expect the rule to have the most 
positive effect on shareholder value in firms with the 
following attributes: ownership structures that will 
allow multiple shareholders to benefit from proxy ac-
cess, boards that are currently aligned with manag-
ers, and characteristics that imply a high degree of 
managerial control. 
Director nomination and shareholder influence 
Agency theory is fundamentally a theory about 
power and influence, and in order to understand cor-
porate strategic leadership, it is important to iden-
tify the distribution of power and influence between 
corporate boards and CEOs (Finkelstein, Hambrick, 
and Cannella, 2009). The relationship between share-
holders and the boards of directors is even more com-
plex than often suggested by agency theory due to 
the CEO’s influence over the director nomination 
process and the resulting loyalty dynamics between 
the board and the CEO. In theory, shareholders elect 
board members to represent the shareholders’ in-
terests. Board members then hire a CEO to lead and 
manage the firm under continuous and effective 
monitoring by the board. However, with the tradi-
tional nomination and renomination process in place, 
directors can be co-opted by the CEO, which compro-
mises their ability to monitor effectively. Research 
shows that CEOs are prone to influence the election 
of directors who are sympathetic to their wishes and 
to whom they have other (e.g., social or familial) ties 
(Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Wade et al., 1990).  
Moreover, the current system of director nomina-
tion allows CEOs to compromise the integrity of di-
rectors’ allegiances, even those who are not initially 
sympathetic to management. Social exchange the-
ory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976) proposes that indi-
viduals feel obligated to repay the benefits they re-
ceive from others in the course of their relationship. 
Those who fail to provide a benefit in return may 
fall victim to various social sanctions, distrust, de-
nial of future benefits, as well as decreased reputa-
2. AFSCME v. AIG. 462 F. 3D 121 (2nd Cir. 2006).  
3. In 2009, the state of Delaware (where most firms are incorporated) passed an amendment to current law that allowed corpora-
tions to voluntarily permit shareholder proxy access, thereby ratifying the status quo. Shortly thereafter, the Delaware Bar Asso-
ciation communicated to the SEC that because of the new law, all action to introduce proxy access regulation at the federal level 
should be halted. Nevertheless, in May 2009, the SEC announced a draft of a new proposed national rule, which would allow 
shareholders to nominate their own director-candidates if they held one, three, or five percent of the firm’s shares—depending 
on the size of a company—for at least one year. 
4. The Act did not in any way require the SEC to adopt new rules or regulations permitting shareholder proxy access to nominate 
directors; it did, however, clearly and directly place the issue in the SEC’s jurisdiction.  
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tion (Gouldner, 1960). Thus, once an individual re-
ceives critical resources from another, he or she will 
attempt to reciprocate, resulting in a quid pro quo re-
lationship. Because directors largely owe their posi-
tions to the top management, especially the CEO, it 
is likely that such social exchange relationships exist 
between directors and the managers whom they are 
supposed to monitor. As board appointment leads 
to greater status within the corporate elite, a director 
likely feels obligated to reciprocate for the director-
ship opportunity, which may result in showing ex-
ecutives more considerate treatment. Shareholders, 
then, may often be engaged in a “tug-of-war” with 
the CEO for the loyalty of directors. Historically, the 
CEO has wielded the power to most strongly influ-
ence this struggle. 
However, allowing shareholders to directly nom-
inate director candidates provides an important tool 
in fighting cronyism between the CEO and the board 
(Ryan and Schneider, 2002). Not only is the share-
holder-nominated candidate not ingratiated to the 
CEO, she/he is unlikely to be sympathetic to man-
agement’s agenda unless that agenda is aligned with 
shareholder interests. Providing more power and in-
fluence to the owners of the firm to nominate cor-
porate directors helps enact relationships that bet-
ter serve owners’ interests, reducing agency costs, 
and leading to more effective governance, which en-
hances value creation. Thus, we predict that greater 
influence over the process of new director nomina-
tion via proxy access will elicit a positive response 
from the market. We also expect that the change in 
shareholder value will be especially pronounced for 
firms where multiple owners are able to benefit from 
this enhanced sphere of influence—that is, where a 
greater number of shareholders meet the two require-
ments for proxy access (3% ownership and three-year 
holding period).5 Therefore: 
Hypothesis 1a: Granting owners greater influence 
in the process of director nomination will elicit a 
positive market reaction. 
Hypothesis 1b: As the number of owners receiving 
greater influence in the process of director nomi-
nation increases, the greater the change in share-
holder value in reaction to the new rule. 
Board characteristics and value creation 
One of the firm characteristics indicative of lower 
shareholder rights and weak governance is the firm’s 
use of a classified (“staggered”) board structure. A 
classified board provision usually only allows one-
third of the board to be elected each year for a three-
year term. This is an important “delay” provision in 
the event of a corporate takeover (Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick, 2003), and, as such, limits the effectiveness of 
the market for corporate control. In fact, a number of 
firms turned to this provision in the 1980s during the 
wave of corporate takeovers; since then, the adoption 
of this provision has been widely criticized by share-
holders, who view it as a mechanism for director and 
management entrenchment (Sundaramurthy, Rech-
ner, and Wang, 1996). Studies show that the adop-
tion of classified board amendments has a significant 
negative effect on stock prices and suggest that this 
provision increases the bargaining power of manage-
ment to the detriment of shareholder wealth (Pound, 
1987). A recent study provides further evidence im-
plying “that staggered boards at least partly cause, 
and not merely reflect, a lower firm value” (Bebchuk 
and Cohen, 2005: 411). 
The presence of a classified board serves as a neg-
ative signal of the firm’s governance quality; be-
cause of this, firms with classified boards have often 
been featured on the CalPERS’ “Reform Focus List” 
of companies targeted for poor governance prac-
tices. Sundaramurthy et al. (1996) found that institu-
tional ownership significantly reduces the likelihood 
of adoption of a classified board, suggesting that ma-
jor shareholders are opposed to this practice. In fact, 
despite increasing numbers of advisory shareholder 
resolutions recommending the dismantling of exist-
ing staggered boards, boards overwhelmingly choose 
not to implement these majority-passed resolutions 
(Bebchuk, 2005). As such, viewing board structure 
through the lens of agency theory as the outcome of a 
5. We thank a thoughtful reviewer for pointing out that ownership concentration may make the firm easier to monitor. How-
ever, including a measure of, for example, percentage of firm shares held by institutions (as a proxy for ownership concentra-
tion) would mask the effect of how many owners would be eligible to gain proxy access and thus benefit from the new rule. 
Moreover, if concentrated ownership per se indeed makes the firm easier to monitor, making the impact of the rule smaller, 
we would expect the opposite finding—a greater number of three percent owners leading to lower (less positive) change in 
shareholder value.   
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bargaining process between shareholders, managers, 
and the board, firms with a staggered board structure 
reflect the primacy of managerial interests over the 
owners’ interest. Such structures suggest higher di-
rector entrenchment and greater loyalty of directors 
toward management rather than shareholders. There-
fore, we expect that granting owners greater influ-
ence over the process of director nomination will be 
received even more positively if the firm has a clas-
sified board structure, as the rule is expected to bring 
more salutary changes in firms with entrenched di-
rectors and/or managers. Formally: 
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a classified or “stag-
gered” board will be positively related to the 
change in shareholder value in reaction to the new 
rule. 
Another important factor affecting the strength 
of board monitoring is the composition of the board 
in terms of the affiliation of each director. Although 
“[b]oard composition has been recognized as one 
of the most significant board dimensions for some 
time,” (Finkelstein et al., 2009: 231), the majority of 
extant research has adopted a simplified categori-
zation of “insider” (i.e., employee of the firm) and 
“outsider” directors (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Outside 
directors are assumed to be more vigilant, as they are 
not under the direct influence of the CEO; as such, 
they are more willing to make independent deci-
sions and, if necessary, take action against manage-
ment. However, as discussed previously, ample evi-
dence suggests that CEOs exert major influence over 
the process of new director selection (Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995). Thus, independence alone may not pre-
vent ingratiation between the CEO and directors. 
In fact, some research suggests that the percentage 
of directors who were appointed after the CEO be-
gan his or her tenure reflects an aspect of CEO power 
(Takacs Haynes and Hillman, 2010). By extension, 
boards with a greater percentage of outside direc-
tors who were appointed before the CEO assumed 
position (i.e., “true outsiders”) have a lower poten-
tial for agency costs due to lower CEO influence 
over the board, and are thus more effective at mon-
itoring and controlling the CEO. As such, increas-
ing shareholder power and influence to nominate fu-
ture directors will be comparatively less beneficial to 
shareholders of firms with a high proportion of true 
outsiders on the board—where a large proportion of 
the board was elected before the CEO, the directors 
are unlikely to feel indebted to the CEO for their po-
sitions. Therefore, firms with a higher percentage of 
true outsiders on the board will experience smaller 
changes in shareholder value in reaction to the proxy 
access provision. Formally: 
Hypothesis 3: The percent of true outsiders on the 
board will be negatively related to the change in 
shareholder value in reaction to the new rule. 
CEO control, agency costs, and shareholder value 
Ownership dispersion lies at the heart of the 
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
agency theory literature recognizes that shareholders 
are not a uniform group, and there may be a diver-
gence of interests among shareholders, in addition to 
the divergence of interests between owners and man-
agers. This is perhaps most prominent in the case of 
shareholders who are also top managers and those 
who are not. Certainly the majority trend is for firms 
to issue equity compensation to top executives, which 
creates a separate class of manager-owners, who can 
use this granted status to exert their power over other 
owners, and more directly, over corporate directors. 
While firm equity is aimed to serve as an alignment 
mechanism when managers make firm strategic de-
cisions, “stock ownership can also be an important 
source of power for the CEO” (Westphal and Zajac, 
1995: 71). In the context of board nomination, it cre-
ates an unintended consequence of granting manag-
ers additional influence. 
Consistent with this argument, CEO equity owner-
ship has been proposed as an indicator of CEO power 
(Finkelstein, 1992; Takacs Haynes and Hillman, 2010; 
Weisbach, 1988), and recent research points to nega-
tive firm outcomes associated with high CEO own-
ership (Walters, Kroll, and Wright, 2008). In large 
public corporations, even relatively low levels of 
ownership can translate into significant influence (di-
rectly or indirectly) over firm decision making. CEOs 
with relatively large equity stakes may have the nec-
essary power to engage in behaviors that limit board 
involvement and allow such CEOs to become en-
trenched in their executive position (Fama and Jen-
sen, 1983; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). As Fiegener 
(2005: 634) notes, CEOs “holding larger ownership 
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stakes may feel empowered” to protect their discre-
tion over firm decisions from board interference. 
Managers have a unique advantage over other own-
ers, as they have access to private information and 
are shielded by mechanisms that promote informa-
tion asymmetry between themselves and other own-
ers. Thus, if an owner is also a top manager, he or 
she can use his or her ownership share to motivate 
key decisions and keep board involvement at arm’s 
length. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, firm own-
ership can create a secondary set of agency costs re-
lated to the additional power it grants the manager, 
while preserving information asymmetry, resulting 
in CEOs being better able to pursue their desires. This 
effect is compounded by the fact that top managers 
are routinely able to influence who monitors them. 
As such, increasing owners’ power and influence in 
director nomination should result in greater positive 
change in shareholder value when CEO ownership 
power is higher.6 Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4: CEO ownership power will be posi-
tively related to the change in shareholder value in 
reaction to the new rule. 
Some environments and circumstances allow top 
managers more discretion than others (Carpenter 
and Golden, 1997). According to Hambrick and Fin-
kelstein (1987), managerial discretion has three dis-
tinct sources: industry and external environment 
characteristics, organization characteristics, and the 
executives’ personal characteristics. We restrict our 
examination to the organizational characteristics 
that serve as a source of discretion (i.e., firm-level 
discretion), which can be defined as “the degree 
to which the organization is amenable to an ar-
ray of possible actions” (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990: 489). Shen and Cho (2005: 844) further refine 
managerial discretion as the latitude of actions—
”the range of strategic options available to man-
agers as they strive to bring about organizational 
outcomes”—and the latitude of objectives, or the 
freedom of managers to pursue personal goals. The 
strategic management literature has predominantly 
discussed and treated discretion from a neutral or 
positive standpoint, which corresponds to the view 
of discretion as the latitude of actions (e.g., Ham-
brick and Abrahamson, 1995). In this view, higher 
discretion simply provides managers greater range 
of strategic options. However, the economics and 
agency literatures conceptualize managerial discre-
tion as the latitude of objectives (e.g., Williamson, 
1963; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
According to agency theory assumptions, manage-
rial discretion often leads to shirking and self-serving 
behaviors on the part of managers to the detriment 
of shareholders (Phillips et al., 2010). High discre-
tion allows managers to pursue personal goals and 
objectives with a low probability of getting caught 
(Shen and Cho, 2005). As Finkelstein and Boyd (1998: 
180n4) note, “agency theory perspective on manage-
rial discretion focuses on the potential decision-mak-
ing freedom of high discretion CEOs and implies that 
such freedom will promote non-profit-maximizing 
choices by the CEO.” Therefore, a CEO’s level of dis-
cretion can be viewed through an agency theory lens 
as an indicator of agency costs—the higher the man-
agerial discretion, the higher the potential for agency 
costs; that is, the potential for self-interested behav-
ior is higher when the CEO’s discretion is high. The 
agency perspective suggests that when CEO discre-
tion is higher, the presence of uncompromised and 
vigilant monitors is especially important, as more 
vigilant directors will be more likely to engage in 
closer monitoring/control behaviors. Thus, we expect 
the change in shareholder value to be greater when a 
CEO has a high level of discretion.  
Moreover, we do not expect this effect to be en-
tirely linear or monotonic; specifically, we expect an 
even higher market reaction for firms led by CEOs 
with relatively high levels of discretion. This is be-
cause when CEO discretion reaches high levels, CEO 
actions become less observable; as such, directors 
may not be able to engage in effective oversight. If 
this ability gets significantly impaired, the board may 
be able to intervene only when inappropriate conduct 
and managerial opportunism is uncovered. When 
this occurs, the presence of monitors who act on be-
half of shareholders and are willing to punish execu-
tives (e.g., through pay cuts or even termination from 
the firm) is required. Research shows that boards are 
6. If the incentive effect of equity ownership dominates the effect of increased CEO power, we would make the opposite predic-
tion—that a less positive change in shareholder value will occur when CEO ownership is higher. While based on prior literature 
we expect that the power effect will dominate in this context, our empirical tests will help to determine if this is, in fact, the case. 
We thank a thoughtful reviewer for pointing out this possibility.   
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generally unwilling to engage in the types of actions 
that threaten managerial interests (e.g., Westphal 
and Khanna, 2003), which is perhaps not surprising 
given that the current director nomination process re-
lies heavily on top management’s selection of direc-
tor candidates. Thus, the ability to nominate monitors 
to the board will be even more critical when the CEO 
has a high level of discretion. 
Hypothesis 5: CEO discretion will be positively re-
lated to the change in shareholder value in reaction 
to the new rule, and even more so at high levels of 
CEO discretion. 
In addition to high CEO power and discretion, 
other firm characteristics related to CEO control can 
be indicative of higher potential agency costs, such 
as the type of resources controlled. While the strate-
gic management literature often highlights the pos-
itive results of resources (e.g., Sirmon, Gove, and 
Hitt, 2008; Sirmon et al., 2010; Sirmon, Hitt, and Ire-
land, 2007), governance scholars recognize that cer-
tain types of resources can create oversight problems, 
resulting in increasing agency costs. For example, 
Jensen (1986) highlights the agency costs of free cash 
flow, which can allow managers to engage in gra-
tuitous expansion of the firm referred to as “empire 
building.” Agency theory also points to the downside 
of high levels of intangible resources within a firm: as 
the tangibility of the firm’s assets decreases, agency 
costs increase (Bathala, Moon, and Rao, 1994; Gomp-
ers, 1995). Specifically, the less tangible the rent-gen-
erating resources, the higher the potential for agency 
costs related to CEO opportunistic behavior: shirk-
ing and misappropriating company funds. Moreover, 
firms with comparatively less tangible resources are 
subject to greater information asymmetries (Harris 
and Raviv, 1991). Due to these information asymme-
tries and the difficulty in finding appropriate bench-
marks, CEOs of firms with higher levels of intangible 
resources enjoy greater latitude for decision making, 
which makes board monitoring more difficult. Be-
cause “intangible assets are harder to monitor and 
easier to steal,” firms with relatively higher levels 
of intangibles require stricter governance standards 
(Durnev and Kim, 2005: 1474). As such, the poten-
tial for agency costs is higher as resource intangibility 
increases, making shareholder power and influence 
over director nomination and selection all the more 
important. Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 6: Resource intangibility will be posi-
tively related to the change in shareholder value in 
reaction to the new rule. 
Shareholder voice and bondholder value 
Proponents of the director primacy model tend to 
argue that granting shareholders greater influence 
over the board will be detrimental to all other stake-
holders’ interests. Greater shareholder voice through 
proxy access may thus have important implications 
for another key group of nonmanagement stakehold-
ers—the firm’s bondholders. Similar to sharehold-
ers, bondholders are external stakeholders with a le-
gal claim against the firm, making the two groups 
similar “in kind.” As Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) 
note in their seminal review, “Corporate governance 
deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment.” Questions dealing with the value 
of claims of shareholders and bondholders, the two 
key suppliers of firms’ financial capital, are then cen-
tral to corporate governance theory. Importantly, al-
though shareholders and bondholders are similar “in 
kind,” the two groups are fundamentally different in 
their rights—stockholders have the right to residual 
claims, but have the lowest priority in bankruptcy, 
while bondholders only receive a fixed payment, 
but have priority when the firm goes into default. 
The tension these different rights create has often 
been highlighted as shareholder-bondholder conflict 
in the agency theory literature (e.g., Black and Cox, 
1976; DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn, 1990; Fama and 
Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Modigliani 
and Miller, 1958; Subramaniam, 1998). In general, the 
literature usually argues that—when given oppor-
tunity— each group will prefer actions that benefit 
themselves, even at the cost of the other group’s wel-
fare. For example, shareholders may opt for pursuing 
risky projects because they share in the upside, while 
creditors are forced to disproportionately bear the 
costs of failure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This sug-
gests that bondholders would be sensitive to regula-
tory changes that benefit the position of shareholders 
vis-à-vis bondholders. However, if rule changes allow 
some shareholders a tool to reign in management—
who are arguably the most powerful of stakehold-
ers—bondholders are likely to react positively, as this 
decreases management’s ability to extract firm value 
at the expense of all other stakeholders. 
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As Bebchuk (2003: 63) points out in reference to 
the relative distribution of power, “there is no reason 
to expect that reduced accountability to sharehold-
ers would translate into increased attention to stake-
holders.” In fact, reduced accountability is likely to 
lead to less attention paid by management to the con-
cerns of non-management stakeholders. If, as we ar-
gue, the current governance system is compromised, 
the distribution of claims between shareholders and 
bondholders is not Pareto efficient; this means that 
creating greater separation between the board and 
management can reduce agency costs and be value 
enhancing, thereby benefiting both share- and bond-
holders. Thus, balancing the influence of manage-
ment by granting shareholders greater voice in the 
director nomination process will be perceived favor-
ably by creditors. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 7: Granting shareholders greater influ-
ence in the process of director nomination will elicit 
a positive bondholder reaction. 
Methods 
Sample and data 
Our sampling frame is publicly traded firms from 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500. Consistent with event 
study methodology, we eliminated firms that expe-
rienced other major events during the study period 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Using Lexis-Nexis, 
we identified firms with confounding events.7 Firms 
with missing data were also excluded. The final sam-
ple consists of 392 firms. 
Daily equity and bond returns, both for the sample 
firms and additional firms that were used to construct 
the market index (as explained below), were collected 
from Datastream. Next, institutional ownership data 
were collected from Thompson Financial’s Institu-
tional Ownership database. Lastly, data reflecting the 
firms’ governance characteristics were obtained from 
Risk Metrics (formerly IRRC). Other firm-level vari-
ables were collected from Compustat. 
Dependent variables 
The market’s reaction to the new SEC proxy ac-
cess rule (Hypothesis 1) and the change in share-
holder value for each individual firm (remaining 
hypotheses) serve as the dependent variables. The 
change in shareholder value “is the unexpected per-
centage change in the stock price surrounding the 
event, or the abnormal return” (Godfrey, Merrill, 
and Hansen, 2009: 433) for each firm. The average 
of all abnormal returns in the sample represents the 
market reaction. 
Abnormal returns enable investigators to iso-
late the impact of an event by controlling for the ex-
pected return. The expected return, by definition, is 
the return that would be expected without the event. 
However, because the SEC rule change impacts all 
public firms in the United States, an expected return 
cannot be calculated based on U.S. markets; instead, 
we require a market index not be influenced by the 
event. Following Zhang (2007), who studied the U.S. 
market’s reaction to the passing of SOX, which also 
affected the entire U.S. market, we use a market in-
dex of Canadian firms to calculate expected returns. 
Because Canadian firms are not subject to the new 
SEC rule, they should not react to the announcement 
of the new rule; at the same time, they are influ-
enced by a similar set of worldwide macroeconomic 
conditions and are exposed to a substantial propor-
tion of common economic news (e.g., Eun and Shim, 
1989). Moreover, of all large stock markets, the Ca-
nadian market is the most closely related to the U.S. 
market.8 As such, publicly traded Canadian firms 
are utilized to calculate the expected return. Specif-
ically, we calculate the market index as an equally 
weighted portfolio of all Canadian firms with non-
missing returns in Datastream for both the estima-
tion and event periods.  
Next, we identify the appropriate “event win-
dow.” While a two-day window is commonly used 
to address information leaking into the market, for 
several reasons, a one-day event window is bet-
ter suited for this research. First, the SEC neither 
7. Specifically, we dropped firms that announced: dividends, repurchases, or earnings (seven firms), gaining or losing large con-
tracts (five firms), merger and acquisition events (nine firms), newly issued patents (three firms), naming a new executive/ offi-
cer (six firms), or major legal issues (two firms).  
8. The correlation has been estimated at 0.62, and the next highest correlation at 0.27, with the U.K. stock market (Roll, 1992). More 
recently, Zhang (2007) reports a U.S.-Canadian return correlation of 0.78.  
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approved nor announced the rule until 25 August 
2010. Second, there was no widely held expectation 
of the outcome of the vote in advance. Competing 
arguments for and against the measure were well 
known, and thus the outcome was uncertain. In fact, 
the vote was tight (3–2 in favor), indicating a lack of 
consensus on the part of the decision makers. In to-
tal then, the outcome was an exogenous event that 
was not predictable before the announcement. Fi-
nally, because as the length of the announcement 
window increases so does the noise-to-informa-
tion ratio, a one-day event window is strongly rec-
ommended for use in event studies in corporate law 
(Bhagat and Romano, 2002a). As such, we restrict 
our event window to the day of the announcement,9 
which reduces noise and potential bias, providing a 
conservative yet accurate estimate of the market’s 
reaction. Following convention, the return on firm 
i’s share price on day t is calculated as: 
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit 
where αi is the intercept term (reflecting the aver-
age return for the firm’s stock with no market move-
ment; Godfrey et al., 2009), β measures the stock per-
formance relative to the market, Rmt is the rate of 
return on a market portfolio on day t , and εit is the 
error term, or the abnormal return. Therefore, the ab-
normal return or change in shareholder value is repre-
sented by: 
ARit = Rit − (αi + βiRmt) 
where αi and βi are coefficient estimates from an or-
dinary least squares regression of Rit on the market 
model over the estimation period before the event; 
using an approach similar to Godfrey et al. (2009), we 
use the daily returns over the period beginning 130 
days prior to the event, ending 10 days before the 
event date. The abnormal return reflects the market’s 
reaction to the announcement, adjusting for the pre-
dicted or “normal” return for that day. 
To test the hypothesis regarding bondholder reac-
tion, we gathered bond return data on our final sam-
ple of 392 firms; 330 firms had sufficient data to be in-
cluded in the analysis. We then adjusted the returns 
based on comparable bonds in the Canadian market. 
Following Bessembinder et al. (2009), who focused on 
measuring abnormal bond returns, we calculated ab-
normal bond returns using the returns to similarly 
rated bonds as the benchmark. We adjusted the re-
turns based on whether the firm has a rating of A or 
above, or a BBB and below rating.10 
Independent variables 
Given that the new regulation provides some own-
ers (i.e., with 3% or more ownership over three years) 
the right to nominate directors, we include a count 
variable of the total number of owners holding at least 
three percent of the firm’s outstanding stock at the 
end of 2009 (the previous calendar year). This repre-
sents the potential number of discrete share owners 
who would receive the benefit of proxy access for the 
purpose of director nomination. We proxy for the to-
tal number of these large shareholders using data on 
institutional investor ownership.11 
Next, two sets of variables were theorized to drive 
the firm-level heterogeneity in the reaction to the an-
nouncement. These variables address: 1) the indepen-
dence/effectiveness of the board, and 2) the costs as-
sociated with CEO control. First, we address factors 
that are related to board characteristics. The “stagger-
ing” of boards, which limits the number of directors 
up for election in any given year, is reflective of the 
level of shareholder power over board structure and 
director entrenchment. Governance scholars argue 
that staggered boards allow managers to extract rents 
and reduce shareholder value (e.g., Bebchuk and Co-
hen, 2005; Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2011). We 
identify a staggered or classified board with a dummy 
variable. Next, board independence is measured by 
true outsider percentage, calculated as the ratio of out-
side directors appointed before the CEO assumed 
the position to the total number of directors (Takacs 
Haynes and Hillman, 2010).   
9. The day after the event, unrelated negative information regarding the nation’s economic outlook was released; thus, we could 
not investigate the momentum effect on the following day. 
10. The results are substantively unchanged if we make the adjustments based on whether the firm has investment grade or spec-
ulative grade bonds. 
11. We cannot identify all private individuals who own at least three percent but less than five percent, the level at which they 
would be required to report as blockholders of the firm. This proxy thus offers a more conservative test of our hypotheses, as it 
may only underestimate of the number of owners who benefit from the rule change.  
1442 Campbell  et  al .  in  Strategic  Management  Journal  33  (2012) 
The second set of factors address CEO control, 
which can affect agency costs, and specifically, the 
portion of agency costs that arise due to CEO shirk-
ing or opportunism. As Godfrey and Hill (1995) dis-
cuss, agency costs are inherently “unobservable”; 
thus, various attempts have been made to capture 
these costs. For example, Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) 
measured agency costs as organizational expenses. 
Instead of relying on such distal outcomes, we chose 
more proximal proxies of the conditions that give 
rise to agency costs. Agency theory proposes that 
managers will pursue their own interests to the de-
gree that they will be able to do so. This suggests 
that high managerial power or discretion provides 
the potential for agency costs. CEO ownership power 
is measured as the percentage of the firm’s outstand-
ing stock owned by the CEO (Finkelstein, 1992) at 
the end of the firm’s 2009 fiscal year (last year avail-
able). We measure CEO discretion based on firm char-
acteristics, using the firm’s capital intensity as a 
proxy (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987), which can 
be viewed as a firm-level indicator of the CEO’s task 
environment (Boyd and Gove, 2006). Calculated as 
the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to the 
total number of employees at the end of the previous 
year, it measures the lack of discretion, thus we mul-
tiply it by -1 to ease interpretation. Finally, because 
intangible resources also grant managers more dis-
cretion, implying greater potential for agency costs, 
we proxy for resource tangibility with estimates of 
the tangibility of the particular firm’s resources, and 
conduct robustness checks based on industry charac-
teristics as discussed later. Following Surroca, Trib´o, 
and Waddock (2010), resource intangibility is mea-
sured as the ratio of research and development ex-
penses to the total number of employees. 
Control variables 
We include a number of control variables for the 
firm’s governance characteristics, which might af-
fect the market’s reaction to the new regulation. Du-
ality, as a proxy for CEO power relative to the board 
(e.g., Tuggle et al., 2010a; Takacs Haynes and Hillman, 
2010), is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is 
also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. CEO ten-
ure, as a proxy for CEO entrenchment and control 
over internal monitoring mechanisms (Berger, Ofek, 
and Yermack, 1997), is measured as the number of 
years the CEO has held the position at the firm at the 
end of the firm’s 2009 fiscal year. Board size is the to-
tal number of directors on board, and is an impor-
tant governance-related predictor of firm value (e.g., 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008). We also control for 
average director age, a proxy for general experience, and 
average director tenure on the board (Tuggle, Schnat-
terly, and Johnson, 2010b), a proxy for directors’ firm-
specific experience. Board percentage ownership is the 
total percentage of the firm’s outstanding stock held 
by board members (excluding the CEO), and controls 
for board financial incentives. We include indicators 
for whether the firm has a cumulative voting, secret bal-
lot, special meeting, or written consent provision (Gom-
pers et al., 2003), all of which can be indicative of the 
level of shareholder power at the firm. Finally, we in-
clude variables that represent the current level of di-
versity on the board, which can affect board dynamics 
(Westphal and Stern, 2007). Female director percentage 
is the percentage of female directors on the board and 
ethnic minority percentage is the percentage of directors 
on the board listed as non-Caucasian. 
Analysis 
We utilize both nonparametric and parametric 
methods to test our theory. First, to determine the 
stock and bond market reaction to the new regula-
tions, we perform a number of t-tests and alternative 
nonparametric tests (as detailed below). We test the 
remainder of our hypotheses using weighted least 
squares regression, where observations with lower 
error in the first stage (market model estimation) are 
weighted more heavily in the analysis.12 We also use 
robust standard errors to mitigate concerns about 
heteroskedasticity.   
Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and corre-
lations. Multicolinearity diagnostics showed that 
the value inflation factor (VIF) was below 3.0 for all 
12. The observations are weighted by the inverse of the standard deviations of the residuals from the market model. This provides 
better estimates by adjusting for market model reliability and placing more weight in the analysis on observations that have 
less noisy first-stage estimates. However, our conclusions are substantively unchanged if we perform standard ordinary least 
squares regressions.   
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variables and mean VIF was below 1.5 for all regres-
sion models, which suggests no multicolinearity 
issues.   
Hypothesis 1a predicted that giving owners 
greater power over director nomination will elicit a 
positive market reaction. Table 2 presents five al-
ternative tests of this hypothesis—three parametric 
tests and two nonparametric tests. The t-test for the 
market’s reaction indicates that the return is signifi-
cantly greater than zero, supporting Hypothesis 1a. 
This conclusion is unchanged if we use: 1) standard-
ized abnormal returns, and 2) a test which accounts 
for the first-stage error (Patell, 1976; Boehmer, Musu-
meci, and Poulsen, 1991), 3) a Wilcoxon signed rank 
test, which accounts for both the sign and the magni-
tude of abnormal returns, or 4) the binomial Z-statis-
tic, which indicates that 291 out of 392 individual re-
turns were positive (74.2% compared to the expected 
proportion of 50%). Moreover, the economic magni-
tude of the reaction is also consequential—the mean 
abnormal return is 0.83%, or 83 basis points. For com-
parison, the average daily return on the S&P 500 in 
2010 was 5 basis points, or 0.05%, per day. Thus, the 
return in our study over a single day is over 16 times 
greater than the average daily return that year. Addi-
tionally, studies in finance have shown returns from a 
well-documented trading strategy, momentum trad-
ing, to be about 100 basis points (or 1%) per month 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 2002). As illustrated, the reac-
tion we detect is economically large. 
Model 1 in Table 3 shows regression results with 
only the control variables. Model 2 in Table 3 in-
cludes our independent variables. Hypothesis 1b pre-
dicted that the number of owners receiving influence 
over director nomination will be positively related to 
the change in shareholder value. The coefficient on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the number of institutional owners holding three per-
cent or more of the firm’s stock in Model 2 is positive 
and statistically significant, supporting Hypothesis 
1b. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1a and 
supports the idea that the positive market reaction is 
driven by the increase in shareholder power over di-
rector nomination. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the use of a classified 
or “staggered” board will be positively related to the 
change in shareholder value in reaction to the new 
Table 2. Tests for whether the stock abnormal return on the day of the event is greater than zero
Test name  Testing  Statistic   Significance
T-test for abnormal return  Mean AR >0  t= 14.860  Pr(T > t) = 0.000
Patell (1976) T-test for  Mean SAR >0                          t= 8.195  Pr(T > t) = 0.000
   standardized abnormal return
Boehmer, Musumeci, and  Mean SAR >0  t= 15.119  Pr(T > t) = 0.000
   Poulsen (1991) T-test for
   standardized abnormal return
Wilcoxon signed-rank test  AR >0  z= 11.367  Prob > |z| = 0.000
Binomial Z statistic  Proportion of observed  k= 291 Observed  Pr(k >= 291) = 0.000
       positive ARs>0.50       proportion = 0.74235
Table 3. Regression models of firm-specific predictors on the 
abnormal return
              Model 1:              Model 2:
               Control            full model
Constant  0.031∗  0.025+
Duality  −0.001  −0.000
CEO tenure  0.000  −0.000
Board size  0.000  0.000
Average director age  −0.000+  −0.000
Average director tenure  −0.000  −0.000
Board % ownership  0.010  0.005
Cumulative voting  −0.004+  −0.003
Secret ballot  −0.000  −0.000
Special meeting  0.000  0.001
Written consent  0.001  0.001
Female director %  0.018∗  0.018∗
Ethnic minority %  −0.015∗  −0.011+
Number of owners   0.001∗
Classified board   0.002∗
True outsider %   −0.007∗
CEO ownership power   0.087∗∗
Low discretion   0.001∗
High discretion   0.226∗∗
Resource intangibility   0.041∗∗
             F  2.53∗∗  3.77∗∗∗
            R2  0.07  0.16
             Adj. R2  0.04  0.12
             N  392  392
+ p < 0.10 ; ∗ p < 0.05 ; ∗∗ p < 0.01 ; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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rule. The coefficient on the classified board indicator 
in Model 2 is positive and marginally significant, of-
fering marginal support for Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the proportion of true 
outsiders on the board will be negatively related to 
the change in shareholder value. The coefficient on 
the true outsider percentage in Model 2 is negative 
and statistically significant, supporting Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that CEO ownership 
power will be positively related to the change in 
shareholder value in reaction to the new rule. The co-
efficient on CEO ownership power in Model 2 of Ta-
ble 3 is positive and statistically significant, support-
ing Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that CEO discretion will 
be positively related to the change in shareholder 
value in reaction to the new rule, and even more so 
at high levels of discretion. Following prior research 
(e.g., Greve, 2003; Sirmon and Hitt, 2009), we utilize a 
spline function to test this hypothesis. A spline func-
tion is appropriate when testing hypotheses that sug-
gest a continuous relationship that changes slope at a 
critical threshold, referred to as a “knot.” Instead of 
dividing the sample and modeling various subsam-
ples individually, which would disrupt the continu-
ity of the function, or forcing a continuous and sym-
metric solution (as a curvilinear term renders), spline 
functions allow for more accurate modeling of non-
linear relationships where the slope changes at a cer-
tain value for one of the variables. In the absence of a 
prespecified theoretical threshold of what value con-
stitutes high firm-level discretion based on the firm’s 
capital intensity, we follow Fiss (2011) in setting the 
knot at the seventy-fifth percentile in our sample,13 
which represents a high level of discretion. Thus, the 
spline function creates two variables from the single 
continuous variable—low discretion (modeling the re-
lationship below the seventy-fifth percentile), and 
high discretion (the relationship above the seventy-
fifth percentile). 
The coefficient on low discretion in Model 2 is pos-
itive and statistically significant, and the coefficient 
on high discretion is also positive and statistically sig-
nificant; moreover, the coefficient on high discretion 
is significantly larger compared to the low discretion 
coefficient (p < 0.05). This shows evidence of a posi-
tive linear relationship, with an increase in the impact 
of discretion at high levels of firm discretion, provid-
ing strong support for Hypothesis 5.14 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that resource intangibility 
will be positively related to the change in shareholder 
value in reaction to the new rule. The resource intan-
gibility coefficient in Model 2 of Table 3 is positive 
and significant, offering support for Hypothesis 6. 
Finally, Hypothesis 7 predicted that giving share-
holders greater power over director nomination will 
elicit a positive bondholder reaction. The three tests 
presented in Table 4 indicate strong statistical support 
for this hypothesis. The results show that, contrary to 
the zero-sum game prediction, bondholders perceive 
the shareholder proxy access rule to also create value 
for creditors and react positively, albeit the economic 
magnitude of the positive reaction is smaller com-
pared to the stock market’s reaction (44 basis points). 
This is an expected outcome, given that the benefit of 
the new rule to bondholders is less direct compared 
with the benefit it provides to shareholders. 
Robustness checks and additional analysis 
We performed a number of additional analyses 
to ensure the robustness of our results. First, we per-
formed all analyses using a global baseline for calcu-
lating abnormal returns, created from all non- U.S. 
stocks with available data in Compustat’s Global data-
base, in lieu of the Canadian baseline. All of our results 
were substantively unchanged from those reported.   
Second, we used alternative measures of CEO dis-
cretion (used to test Hypothesis 5). We first consid-
ered a measure based on sales growth. Because our 
argument is based on discretion at the firm level, we 
used the firm’s industry-adjusted sales growth over 
the previous five years as a proxy for discretion (Boyd, 
1990; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998); this approach takes 
into account both firm-level and industry-related vari-
ance (Boyd and Gove, 2006). Managers at firms with 
relatively high growth would be expected to have 
greater discretion, and thus shareholders at such 
13. Our conclusions remain unchanged if we set the fiftieth percentile in our sample as the knot, and are robust to a number of 
other specifications between the fiftieth and eightieth percentiles. 
14. If we model the change in the impact of discretion as a ‘change-in-intercept’ as opposed to ‘change-in-slope,’ using the full 
range of the continuous variable and an indicator variable for levels above the seventy-fifth percentile, the results and conclu-
sions remain unchanged.
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firms would benefit more from the announcement of 
the new rule. Our results using this alternate mea-
sure continue to provide strong support for Hypothe-
sis 5. Secondly, we used the firm’s free cash flow (Jen-
sen, 1986) as a measure of the value that the manager 
would have the ability to extract from the firm. Re-
sults using this measure again provide general sup-
port for our hypothesis. We find that discretion con-
tinues to have a significant impact on the change in 
shareholder value when discretion is high.15 
Third, we used an alternative measure of firm re-
source intangibility (Hypothesis 6), based on the na-
ture of the firm’s primary industry. Firms in service 
industries create value mainly from intangible re-
sources, such as knowledge (Williams, 2007) and hu-
man capital (Hitt et al., 2001). We created a service 
industry indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s pri-
mary industry is classified as service industry based 
on the 48 industry Fama-French classification (Fama 
and French, 1997), and 0 otherwise. This classifica-
tion of service industries is largely based on the clas-
sification used by the U.S. Department of Labor and 
the U.S. Census Bureau (SIC codes with prefix 70–89, 
based on the 1987 SIC Manual), with three additional 
industries: commercial printing, advertising spe-
cialty, and warehousing/storage. The findings show 
that firms in industries with less tangible resources 
do indeed experience significantly greater change in 
shareholder value (the coefficient on the service in-
dustry dummy variable is positive and highly signif-
icant), providing further support for Hypothesis 6. 
Finally, we investigated whether the relationship be-
tween CEO ownership and the change in shareholder 
value is in fact nonlinear, because our theory suggests 
that the relationship could be driven primarily by 
high levels of CEO equity that provide the CEO with 
powerful leverage. We used a spline function to let 
the coefficient vary above and below the seventy-fifth 
percentile ownership, and the results suggest that the 
relationship is indeed stronger (i.e., the coefficient is 
larger and statistically significant) at high equity lev-
els; all of our other conclusions are unaltered if we 
model CEO ownership in this fashion. Also, the re-
sults remain substantively unchanged if we set the 
threshold at the seventieth or eightieth percentile.   
Discussion 
This study examines the complex relationships be-
tween the corporation’s stakeholders from an agency 
theory perspective. Drawing from an ongoing debate 
among legal scholars that juxtaposes two perspec-
tives related to who the board “works for,” we ex-
amine the effects of giving shareholders greater in-
fluence in the nomination of directors. We provide 
answers to the following questions: Does such power 
create value? If so, what is this value creation con-
tingent upon? Finally, does such power benefit other 
stakeholders? We utilize the SEC’s announcement of 
a new proxy access rule as a natural experiment to 
answer these questions. More specifically, we inves-
tigated the market’s reaction to the SEC’s announce-
ment of the new rule, which grants large, long-term 
shareholders greater rights in the process of director 
nomination. Under the new rule, shareholders own-
ing at least three percent of the firm’s traded stock 
for three consecutive years will be able to nominate 
Table 4. Tests for whether the bond abnormal return on the day of the event is greater than zero
Test name  Testing Statistic      Significance
T-test for abnormal return  Mean AR >0   t= 6.540   Pr(T > t) = 0.000
Wilcoxon signed-rank test  AR >0 z= 5.819   Prob > |z| = 0.000
Binomial Z statistic (N = 330)  Proportion of observed  k= 208 Observed   Pr(k >=208) = 0.000
     positive ARs>0.50    proportion = 0.63030
The Patell (1976) and Boehmer et al. (1991) t-test are not available for bond abnormal returns because they require regression 
residuals in order to be calculated, and the proper method for calculating bond abnormal returns is not a regression-based technique 
(please see Bessembinder et al., 2009).
15. Small amounts of free cash might help the firm to maintain enough liquidity for opportunities requiring immediate invest-
ment, but are more easily monitored by shareholders. On the other hand, high amounts of free cash would likely be unneces-
sary to maintain reasonable liquidity and would be more difficult to monitor, leading to higher potential agency costs, which 
should lead to greater positive shareholder reaction to the new rule.   
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at least one new director candidate (and up to 25% 
of the board size) per election. Following our theory, 
the results show that regulatory oversight that bal-
ances out the power between shareholders and man-
agement with respect to affecting board composi-
tion plays an influential role in increasing firm value. 
Our results show that the market reacted in a signif-
icant and positive manner to the passage of this new 
rule, and that the magnitude of the reaction was pos-
itively related to the number of owners who would 
be eligible to benefit from the new rule. The reac-
tion was not only statistically significant but also ec-
onomically significant. Thus, the first contribution of 
this study is showing that additional value is created 
when owners are granted greater voice in the firm’s 
governance, and thus supporting the argument put 
forth by “shareholder democracy” advocates that 
shareholder voice helps reduce agency losses (e.g., 
Bebchuk, 2005; 2006). 
Importantly, beyond investigating the primary ef-
fect, we presented theory and evidence explicating 
when shareholder voice is most critical. By examin-
ing two sets of factors that help explain the magni-
tude of change in shareholder value, we contribute 
to our understanding of how agency conflicts be-
tween owners, directors, and managers reduce firm 
value. First, we focused on factors that signify weak 
governance; specifically, certain characteristics of the 
board. As hypothesized, the change in shareholder 
value was more positive for firms with less inde-
pendent boards, indicated by factors such as a stag-
gered board structure and a low proportion of true 
outsider directors. Second, we investigated factors 
related to the CEO control, which can affect agency 
costs, and specifically agency costs due to CEO 
shirking or opportunism. Here, we again find sup-
port that the change in shareholder value is greater 
for firms with higher levels of potential agency costs 
due to greater CEO control. We show that the abil-
ity of owners to nominate directors is more critical 
when the CEO is a powerful owner, has higher lev-
els of discretion, and the firm possesses greater lev-
els of intangible resources, as these are conditions 
that lead to increased potential for top managers to 
pursue their own agendas and extract private bene-
fits at the expense of shareholders. As such, a second 
contribution of this study is identifying firm-specific 
factors that are detrimental to firm value in the ab-
sence of effective board oversight. 
Lastly, we investigated whether providing share-
holders greater voice in director nomination appears 
to be value increasing or value reducing to another 
key stakeholder group—the firm’s creditors. Director 
primacy advocates often argue that granting share-
holders greater influence in the firm’s governance will 
be to the detriment of all other stakeholder groups. 
Contrary to this position though, and in further sup-
port of shareholder primacy advocates’ arguments 
(e.g., Bebchuk, 2003; 2005), we find that reducing man-
agement’s singular influence over board composi-
tion benefits both shareholders and bondholders, sup-
porting the idea that “the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend.” Overly powerful management is perceived as 
value destroying by both groups, despite their differ-
ences. As such, this study contributes to the decades-
old debate on the shareholder-bondholder conflict by 
illuminating conditions under which the interests of 
these two very different groups are aligned. 
In total, then, we show that greater shareholder 
voice in matters of board nomination increases mar-
ket value, especially where ownership structures al-
low multiple shareholders to benefit from proxy 
access, where boards are currently aligned with 
managers rather than shareholders, and where firm 
characteristics imply a high degree of managerial 
control. However, extreme positions on proxy ac-
cess by shareholders could undermine this apparent 
benefit. For example, the positive results we found 
were based on a proxy rule that could be construed 
as “balancing” the concerns of both the shareholder 
and director primacy perspectives, in that access 
was provided to heavily vested, long-term share-
holders (3% ownership for three years). On the other 
hand, if access is eased via requirements of lower 
ownership and/or a shorter holding period, the re-
sults may lead to negative outcomes, as short-term 
owners could manipulate the firm for their direct 
benefit. This is suggested by the findings of Larcker 
et al. (2011), who show that a proposed version of a 
proxy rule related to as little as one percent owner-
ship for one year negatively affected value creation. 
It seems that the concerns of both perspectives—too 
much shareholder power over the board is bad per 
the director primacy view and too little or no con-
trol is bad per the shareholder perspective—are 
valid. Thus the last contribution of our study is the 
integration of corporate law literature into strate-
gic management research, which can lead to a better 
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understanding of how governance impacts firm per-
formance and firm value. 
This study is also unique in its design, which 
uses an event study in the context of a natural ex-
periment—an external event that was not under the 
firms’ control. Employing event study methodology 
in these types of settings—new rules, laws, and reg-
ulations—allows for powerful inferences as it elimi-
nates the threat of endogeneity, commonly present 
in strategic management research. As such, natural 
experiments present a great opportunity to test the-
ories, such as agency theory, which have received 
mixed support in prior work. 
Limitations and future research 
Given that we test our hypotheses using a natu-
ral experiment—an exogenous shock, which impacts 
the population of publicly traded firms—the validity 
of our findings is high. However, given that we limit 
our investigation to a sample of large (S&P 500) firms, 
future studies should test whether the results hold in 
a wider sample of firms. Furthermore, future research 
can examine the impact of industry context on the 
market’s reaction to greater proxy access. For exam-
ple, was the reaction more positive in highly dynamic 
industries where firms may benefit from a greater di-
versity of director background and experience? Con-
versely, was the reaction smaller in highly munificent 
industries? It is also possible that greater power in 
the process of director nomination, and hence greater 
control over the board, may be more important to 
shareholders of firms in regulated or controversial 
(e.g., polluting) industries. 
We limited our investigation of firm characteris-
tics to agency problem-related issues. An interest-
ing extension may explore how previous firm strat-
egy affects shareholder reaction to greater director 
nomination access. For example, does high merger 
and acquisition activity lead to greater shareholder 
appreciation of proxy access? Also, how does stake-
holder strategy affect it? Some firms (and, by exten-
sion, corporate boards) put much greater emphasis 
on broader stakeholder issues; it could be interesting 
to examine how these efforts are differentially val-
ued by different stakeholder groups, such as share-
holders and bondholders. Moreover, future research 
should further investigate not only whose interests 
the board usually represents, providing important 
insights to the largely normative corporate law de-
bate, but also when director attention shifts from one 
group to the other (shareholder to stakeholder is-
sues, and vice versa). 
Our results suggest that greater shareholder voice, 
when it acts to reign in managerial power and help 
prevent opportunism, may in fact be beneficial to 
other stakeholder groups. While our study limits the 
analysis to bondholders, future research can investi-
gate whether greater shareholder voice translates to 
positive outcomes for additional stakeholders. It is 
possible that firms where shareholders yield substan-
tial influence, sometimes referred to as “democra-
cies,” also tend to invest in other stakeholder-focused 
initiatives and exhibit high corporate social perfor-
mance. On the other hand, it may be that too much 
shareholder power sways the focus on shareholder-
only benefits, especially in the case of powerful short-
term owners, as research suggests that stakeholder 
management is likely to pay off in the long run. 
Implications for practice 
While strongly grounded in extant theory, this 
study is, by its natural experiment design, closely 
tied to its empirical context. We examined the mar-
ket’s reaction to a specific event—the initial passing 
of the new SEC proxy access (director nomination) 
rule on 25 August 2010. This new rule has stirred up 
substantial controversy. Indeed, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and Business Roundtable almost immedi-
ately brought a lawsuit in the federal appeals court in 
the District of Columbia (i.e., D.C. Circuit) against the 
SEC to challenge this rule. To represent them in their 
fight against the SEC, and perhaps to signal their se-
riousness about it, these groups hired a prominent 
Washington D.C. attorney, Eugene Scalia.16  
On 22 July 2011, it became apparent that the 
group’s efforts were successful, with the D.C. Cir-
cuit overturning the SEC’s adoption of the proxy ac-
cess rule as “arbitrary,” “capricious,” and an “abuse 
of discretion” (Business Roundtable and Chamber of 
Commerce v. SEC, 2011: 6). In its opinion, the D.C. 
Circuit explicitly adopted an “anti-Bebchuk” view of 
extant legal scholarship, going to the extent of explic-
itly quoting from and citing a 2006 law review arti-
cle, which directly attacked Bebchuk (Strine, 2006; 
16. Scalia is the son of U.S. Supreme Court Justice and former D.C. Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia.   
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Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce v. 
SEC, 2011: 14–15). In addition, the D.C. Circuit chided 
the SEC for not fully analyzing the costs and benefits 
of the rule, and in particular for not doing sufficient 
“economic analysis” with regard to the purported 
“shareholder value creation” related to the rule. The 
federal appeals court stated that it felt that the SEC 
“relied upon insufficient empirical data when it con-
cluded that the proxy access rule (14a–11) will im-
prove board performance and increase shareholder 
value” (Business Roundtable and Chamber of Com-
merce v. SEC, 2011: 11). 
On 6 September 2011, SEC Chair Mary L. Schap-
iro issued a statement that said that the SEC had de-
cided, for now, not to appeal the D.C. Circuit’s deci-
sion. She did, however, reiterate her support for the 
proxy access rule, simply noting that the SEC wanted 
to “carefully consider and learn” from the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s objections before the agency determined “the 
best path forward.” She then ordered the SEC staff to 
conduct a careful review of the issue (SEC, 2011). 
In this context, our study seems unusually timely. 
In providing clear empirical evidence with respect to 
shareholder value creation and the SEC’s proxy ac-
cess rule, we provide direct assistance to policy mak-
ers as they respond to the federal appeals court’s 
objections to the rule. Importantly, we show that 
the rule appears to benefit another key stakeholder 
group, firm bondholders, addressing the objections of 
some its opponents. As such, we help to empirically 
inform the discourse on the role of public policy in 
corporate law (Bhagat and Romano, 2002b). 
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